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Abstract
We present an investment model integrated with trust-reputation mech-
anisms where agents interact with each other to establish investment
projects. We investigate the establishment of investment projects, the
influence of the interaction between agents in the evolution of the distri-
bution of wealth, as well as the formation of common investment networks
and some of their properties. Simulation results show that the wealth dis-
tribution presents a power law in its tail. Also, it is shown that the trust
and reputation mechanism presented leads to the establishment of net-
works among agents, which present some of the typical characteristics of
real-life networks like a high clustering coefficient and short average path
length. 1
Keywords: agent-based computational economics, trust/reputation dy-
namics, investment networks
1 Introduction
Recently, different socio-economical problems have been modeled using agent-
based simulations, presenting a different perspective (usually more flexible and
realistic) for modeling social and economical behavior. Many important con-
tributions to this field are provided by the research group called agent-based
computational economics (ACE) [11, 12]. Different ACE models have been
proposed to study for example the relationship between market structure and
worker-employer interaction networks [5], investors and brokers in financial mar-
kets [6], among others. A key concern in many of these studies is to understand
the loyalty from buyers to sellers by means of repeated business [5], as well as
the mechanisms for coalition formation between agents which for example may
depend on voluntary agreement and payoff of the agents [3].
Other interesting contributions have been made to understand the emergence
of networks between the agents, for example trading networks among buyers
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and sellers who adaptively select their trade partners by looking at their past
experiences [11]. Finally, also of interest is to investigate the topology of the
networks emerging from the interaction between agents, usually using methods
borrowed from the field of statistical physics [1].
The main goal of this paper is to improve the understanding of two main
problems in ACE models: (i) the economical component that describes the
dynamics of the wealth distribution among agents; and (ii) the social component
that describes the dynamics of loyalty, trust and reputation among agents. For
this, we integrate in this article a wealth distribution model based on constant
proportional investments and a network formation model where agents interact
with each other to establish investment projects.
2 The Model
2.1 Wealth dynamics
Consider an agent-based system populated with N agents, where each agent
posses a budget xk(t) (measure of its “wealth” or “liquidity”) that evolves over
time given the following dynamic:
xk(t+ 1) = xk(t)
[
1 + rmk(t) qk(t)
]
+ a(t), (1)
where rmk(t) denotes the return on investment (RoI) that the agent k receives
from its investment qk(t) in projectm. qk(t) denotes a proportion of investment,
i.e the fraction or ratio of the budget of agent k that the agent prefers to invest
in a market and a(t) denotes an external income.
In this model, agent k invests a portion qk(t)xk(t) of its total budget at
every time step t yielding a gain or loss in the market m, expressed by rmk(t).
Similar wealth models have been presented in [9, 4, 7] where the dynamics of
the investment model are investigated using some results from the theory of
multiplicative stochastic additive processes [2, 10].
Note that this approach assumes that the market, which acts as an envi-
ronment for the agent, is not influenced by its investments, i.e. the returns are
exogenous and the influence of the market on the agent is simply treated as
random. This is a crucial assumption which makes this approach different from
other attempts to model real market dynamics, e.g. in financial markets [6].
2.2 Trust-reputation mechanisms and project establish-
ment
In order to launch a particular investment project m at time t, a certain min-
imum amount of money Ithr needs to be collected among the agents. The
existence of the investment threshold Ithr is included to enforce the interac-
tion between agents, as they need to collaborate until the following condition is
reached:
Im(t) =
Nm∑
k
qk(t)xk(t) ≥ Ithr, (2)
where Nm is the number of agents collaborating in the particular investment
project m. There may be different investment projects m at the same time, but
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for simplicity, it is assumed that each agent participates in only one investment
project at a time.
The first essential feature to be noticed for the formation of common invest-
ment networks is the establishment of preferences between agents. It is assumed
that the decision of an agent to collaborate in a project will mainly depend on
the previous history it has gained with other agents. Consider an agent k which
accepts to collaborate in the common investment project m initiated by agent
j. Thus, agent k receives the following payoff at time t:
pkj(t) = xk(t) qk(t) rm(t). (3)
Reiterated interactions between agent k and agent j lead to different payoffs
over time that are saved in a decision weight:
wkj(t+ 1) = pkj(t) + wkj(t) e
−γ , (4)
where γ represents the memory of the agent with initial condition wkj(0) = 0.
The payoffs obtained from previous time steps t may have resulted from the
collaborative action of different agents, however, these are unknown to agent k,
i.e agent k only realizes the initiator of the project, agent j. Furthermore, in
order to mirror reality, it is assumed that there are more investors than initiators
of projects. For this, we consider that from the population of N agents only a
small number J are initiators, i.e. J ≪ N , where the reputation of an initiator
j can be calculated as follows (for more on trust and reputation models see [8]):
Wj(t+ 1) =
N∑
k=0
wkj(t); Wk(t+ 1) =
J∑
j=0
wkj(t). (5)
At every time step t an initiator is chosen randomly from the population and
assigned with an investment project. The initiator randomly tries to convince
other agents to invest in the project until an amount larger than the threshold
Ithr has been collected. For this, we use a Gibbs or Boltzmann distribution to
determine the probability that the contacted agent k may accept the offer of
agent j:
τkj(t) =
eβwkj(t)∑J
i=1 e
βwki(t)
, (6)
where in terms of the weight wkj , the probability τkj(t) considers the good or
bad previous experience with agent j with respect to the experience obtained
with other initiators; and β denotes the greediness of the agent, i.e. how much
importance does the agent give to the decision weight wkj . In order to take
a decision, agent k uses a technique analogous to a roulette wheel where each
slice is proportional in size to the probability value τkj(t). Thus, agent k draws
a random number in the interval (0, 1) and accepts to invest in the project of
agent j if the segment of agent j in the roulette spans the random number.
Finally, an initiator j stops to contact other agents if either the investment
project has reached the threshold Ithr or if all agents in the population have
been asked for collaboration. If the project could be launched it has to be
evaluated. The evaluation should in general involve certain “economic” criteria
that also reflects the nature of the project. However, for simplicity we assume
that the failure or success of an investment project Im is randomly drawn from
a uniform distribution, i.e. r(t) ∼ U(−1, 1).
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3 Results of Computer Simulations
We performed some simulations using the parameter values in Table 1, for sim-
plicity, we assume that the initial budget is the same for all agents. Moreover,
the proportion of investment is assumed to be constant and the same for all
agents i.e. qk(t) = q = const..
Table 1: Parameter values of the computer experiments for the investment
networks formation model.
Parameter Value
Num. of agents N = 104
Num. of initiators J = 100
Num. of time steps t = 105
Investment threshold Ithr = 9
Return on Investment r ∼ U(−1, 1)
Parameter Value
Initial budget xk(0) = 1
Income ak = 0.5
Memory γk = 0.1
Greediness βk = 1
Fig. 1 (left) shows the evolution of the budget distribution over time for
q = 0.5. Note that the probability distribution of the budget converges to a
stationary distribution with a power law in the tail, a property of investment
models based on multiplicative processes repelled from zero [10, 7].
Fig. 1 (right) shows the distribution of the budget at time step t = 105 for
different proportion of investment qk = q. Note that even for a large number of
time steps, the budget distribution for agents with a proportion of investment of
q = 0.1 has not yet converged to a stationary distribution, whereas for q = 0.5
and q = 0.9, the distribution reached a stationary state after t = 70000 and
t = 50000 time steps, respectively.
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Figure 1: (left) Evolution of the budget distribution over time for q = 0.5; (right)
budget distribution at time step t = 105 for different proportion of investment
q. Additional parameters as in Table 1.
Now, in order to understand the role that initiators play in the dynamics of
the investment model, we examine the evolution of their budget and reputation
over time. For the sake of clarity, we show the rank-size distribution of the
budget instead of the probability distribution of the budget. Fig. 2 (left) shows
the rank-size distribution of the budget of the initiators, note that the slope
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of the distribution increases over time. It is also interesting to examine the
evolution of the budget of the initiator with the largest and the smallest budget
at the end of the simulation. This is shown in the inset of Fig. 2 (left), note that
the budget of the best agent was not always increasing over time. Fig. 2 (right)
shows the rank-size distribution of the reputation of the initiators, Eq. (5), note
that the distribution does not change over time and only for a small number
of agents there is a significant increase or decrease on reputation over time.
Moreover, it can be shown that the average value of the reputation has a shift
to larger positive values over the course of time. This occurs due to aggregation
over time of the external incomes a(t) in Eq. (1) into the dynamics of the decision
weights in Eq. (4). Moreover, the inset in Fig. 2 (right) shows the reputation
of the best and the worst initiator indicating the presence of no symmetrical
positive/negative reputation values.
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Figure 2: Evolution of the rank-size distribution of initiators for: (left) budget;
(right) reputation. Insets show the budget and reputation, respectively, of the
best and the worst initiator. Additional parameters as in Table 1.
The influence of the other parameters in the dynamics of the model was
also analyzed, however, for the sake of brevity, we discuss only the role of the
number of initiators J in the dynamics. It can be shown that if a less number
of initiators is considered, then more investors will be willing to invest in their
projects, leading to a larger amount of investment that can be collected by the
initiators. It was mentioned before that the tail of the wealth distribution has
a power law distribution and it can be shown that the larger J the larger the
slope of the power law. The reason for this is that a small number of initiators
collect more money from the investors leading to larger profits and looses which
over time lead to wider distributions than for a large number of initiators.
4 Structure of Common Investment Networks
In this section, we analyze the topology of the networks for different constant
proportion of investment. For this, we run different computer experiments for
a small population of agents N = 1000 (N is also the number of nodes in the
network) and the other parameter values as in Table 1. The first experiment
investigates the influence of the proportion of investment in the properties of
the network. Fig. 3 shows the networks emerging from the investment and
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trust-reputation models for different proportion of investment q at time step
t = 1000. Note that these networks have two types of nodes, the red(bold)
nodes represent investors and the blue(gray) nodes represent initiators. Based
on visual impression, the density of the network decreases with respect to the
proportion of investment. This occurs because agents investing more also tend
to loose more, which leads to more mistrust.
However, from the visual representation of the network it is not possible to
draw many conclusions from the dynamics of the networks. Thus, we obtained
the following typical properties of the networks:
• Number of links V and maximal degree kmax (the degree of the highest
degree vertex of the network).
• Average path length l: the average shortest distance between any pair of
nodes in the network. Small world networks have a small average path
length which scales logarithmically with the size of the network, i.e. l ∼
logN [13].
• Clustering coefficient C: measures the transitivity of the network. It has
been shown that in real social networks the clustering coefficient is usually
much larger than the clustering coefficient in a random network with the
same number of nodes and links [13].
For the sake of brevity, we present on the following the most important
results for our analysis on the previous listed properties of the networks. First,
it can be shown that the number of links V over time fits a power law where the
slope of the power law decreases if the proportion of investment increases. The
maximal degree kmax of the network also increases over time with a power-law
behavior. It can be shown that the clustering coefficient C is larger for small
proportions of investment. This occurs because a small proportion of investment
leads to a higher clustering in the network due to the mistrust that large losses
generate in the investors.
Table 2 shows some of the most important characteristics for different num-
ber of investors N and initiators J for a large number of time steps, i.e. t = 105.
For each network we indicate the average degree 〈k〉 (the first moment of the de-
gree distribution), the average path length l and the clustering coefficient C. For
comparison reasons we include the average path length lrand = log (N)/ log (〈k〉)
and the clustering coefficient Crand = 〈k〉 /N that can be obtained from a ran-
dom network with the same average degree 〈k〉 of the investment networks.
Table 2: Properties of the investment networks for different number of investors
and initiators. For each network the properties measured are: the average degree
〈k〉, the average path length l and the clustering coefficient C. For proportion
of investment q = 0.5, t = 105 and further parameters as in Table 1.
N J V kmax 〈k〉 l C lrand Crand
1000 10 4847 517 0.9694 2.05766 0.74557 - 0.0009694
2000 20 19972 1050 3.9944 1.99365 0.71337 5.488 0.0019972
3000 30 41073 1475 8.2146 1.99314 0.71130 3.8018 0.0027382
10000 100 134279 1477 26.86 2.1563 0.24136 2.7989 0.002686
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It can be seen that the average degree 〈k〉 increases with respect to the sys-
tem size. Note that for the parameters: N = 1000; J = 10, the average degree
of the network is less than one, which means that the network has either trees
or clusters containing exactly one link. In general, the networks show a small
average path length l ≈ 2, meaning that any investor or initiator in the net-
work is in average connected to each other by two links. Moreover, for a large
number of nodes, the average path of the networks is approximately equal to
that from a random graph generated with same average degree of the invest-
ment network. On the other hand, the clustering coefficient of the investment
networks is larger than the clustering coefficient of a random network, this indi-
cates the presence of transitivity in our networks. This occurs mainly because
of the large number of investors connected to initiators. Note that the values
of C in our networks are similar to the clustering coefficient obtained for real
bipartite networks, for example it has been reported that the clustering coeffi-
cient for the network of movie actors is C = 0.79 [13]. Note that a property of
random networks is that the clustering coefficient decreases with respect to the
size of the network. Finally, note that the clustering coefficient of the networks
decreases with respect to N , this is in qualitative agreement with properties of
small-world networks [13].
5 Conclusions and Further Work
The most important conclusions that can be drawn from the model here pre-
sented are that the budget of the agents reaches a stationary distribution after
some time steps and presents a power law distribution on the tail, property
discussed in other investment models [10, 9, 7]. It was shown that the topology
of the investment networks emerging from the model was analyzed showing that
the networks present some of the typical characteristics of real-life networks like
a high clustering coefficient and short average path length. It was also observed
that the evolution over time of the number of links V , the maximal degree of the
network kmax and the clustering coefficient C can be described by a power-law.
We focused our investigations on the feedback describing the establishment
and reinforcement of relations among agents and initiators, which dynamic is
mainly driven by the decision weights wkj(t), Eq. (4). This is considered a
“social component” of the agents’ interaction and it was shown how this feedback
process based on positive or negative experience may lead to the establishment
of networks among agents.
For simplicity, we have just assumed a random selection of failure or suc-
cess, but we note that more elaborated economic assumptions, such as market
dynamics based on supply and demand, can be taken into account as well. Fur-
thermore, we noted that the external income sources play an important role
on the dynamics of reputation and trust among agents. The results presented
indicate that an extra mechanism or behavioral component needs to be added
to the model in order to obtain networks with a stationary power-law degree
distribution, property which is usually found in real-world networks.
We note also that further experiments are needed for different memory γ
and greediness β values to understand the influence of these parameters in the
dynamics of the networks.
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Figure 3: Common investment networks for different proportions of investment
at time step t = 1000: (left) q = 0.1, (right) q = 0.5 and (bottom) q = 0.9.
A link between agents represents a positive decision weight, i.e wkj > 0. For
N = 1000 investors (blue-gray nodes) and J = 10 initiators (red-bold nodes).
Additional parameters as in Table 1.
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